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Brace Yourselves for the posts

enlli
Very Insightful Person
Very Insightful Person

https://amp.theguardian.com/business/2023/feb/16/o2-virgin-mobile-costumers-bills-increase

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28 REPLIES 28


@Roger_Gooner wrote:

I think you're making the mistake that everyone makes in believing RPI is an indication of an operator's costs, and therefore price rises should be kept within RPI or, better still, CPI. The reality is that everyday overheads and heavy network investments have to be paid for, and these costs can easily exceed RPI. VM funds these costs by a combination of turnover plus debt which, as you well know, is astronomical and therefore requires costly interest payments.


For crying out loud Roger, stop defending the indefensible.  

Regarding investments, it's only the YoY change in capex that would affect prices* and VM's freshly laundered results show capex went up 4.5% last year (after an in-year tariff hike of 5.5%).  Those same results, for those who can interpret them, show that VMO2's costs went DOWN, because revenue was near enough flat at +0.1%, whereas EBITDA improved by +6.3%, showing that VMO2's net operating costs and cost of sales went down by £232m.  If we treat capex as cash, then the increase in 2022 was 84m, less the £232m cost savings that's a reduction of £148m, across VM's say 6m customers then using your "need to pay for any changed costs" that's a £25 a year reduction for each customer this year, based on VM's actual costs and capex.  And if you want to include interest, then (if VMO2's accounts are to be believed) then the company actually make a net profit from the balance of financing income and financing costs, and that improved by a further £110m.  

If we ignore my "shoebox accounting" above, just look at adjusted free cash flow in the results.  In just the last three months of each year, VMO2 had £294m additional aFCF in just the last three months of each year.

* Using your implicit but wrong assumption that existing customers should pay for all capex.  The network extension element which I hazard a guess at half the total should be an equity investment eventually paid back by successful sales to the new customers served, not simply funded by extorting money existing customers with bogus inflationary increases.  

Sheesh, this is hard work.

Anonymous
Not applicable

They are indeed an interesting set of accounts. I'll have a slightly longer scan this weekend and post up my "quick takes". 


@Anonymous wrote:

They are indeed an interesting set of accounts. I'll have a slightly longer scan this weekend and post up my "quick takes". 


Good luck with that!  VMO2's announced results are so non-transparent and selective that there's nothing in them I'd want to base investment decisions on even if I were managing somebody else's money.  In fact, if somebody presented me with these in a work context, they'd get a very frank opinion explaining that if they couldn't do vastly better then they should consider new lines of employment.

Key points I spotted include continuing decline in fixed line ARPU to a miserable £47.07 for Q4 2022, broadband customers up by 57k YoY, but network extensions during the year passed an additional 495k homes, total debt £20.2 billion. Net profit for the full year was £452m, a big improvement on 2021's £12m, but it seems the profitable O2 are bailing out a loss making VM.  Wonder how well that's going down at Telefonica?  Maybe that's why they've gambled on such a huge price rise.  The surrounding prose to the accounts is the usual happy-clappy tishe that explains nothing, but may impress the feeble minded by cherry picking a few numbers and promoting them as a positive - for example much talk of "CTC" as though it's an important performance metric, when in reality it's just what normal companies would classify as exceptional costs of the merger.  

All in all, the results are as clear as mud, and in my view the reluctance to publish timely and comprehensive group accounts to full UK GAAP, including P&L, BS and CF tells its own story. 

How odd that you believe that VM is "loss making" but find it objectionable that VM should attempt to get back to profitability by raising its prices by an average of 13.8% - which is broadly in line with other operators (less that BT and TalkTalk but more than Sky).

--
Hub 5, TP-Link TL-SG108S 8-port gigabit switch, 360
My Broadband Ping - Roger's VM hub 5 broadband connection


@Roger_Gooner wrote:

How odd that you believe that VM is "loss making" but find it objectionable that VM should attempt to get back to profitability by raising its prices by an average of 13.8% - which is broadly in line with other operators (less that BT and TalkTalk but more than Sky).


and some ISPs having none during contract terms at least 😉

Put all the facts there Mr Gooner 🙂

Anyway lets wait for the statistics to be published next (not the ones just published before price increase). Lets see how many join and how many leave.

Then, we go on to the figures for turnover and actual revenue profit per customer....

Me thinks VM will have some silly discounts for new customers and crazy cashback credits or free TVs again just in time for the next statistics round....


@Roger_Gooner wrote:

How odd that you believe that VM is "loss making" but find it objectionable that VM should attempt to get back to profitability by raising its prices by an average of 13.8% - which is broadly in line with other operators (less that BT and TalkTalk but more than Sky).


I don't find it all objectionable that they should be seeking to sort out years of unprofitability - indeed, I've pointed the need out to you by showing what can be deduced from the limited data the company make available.  Although if VM hadn't run a business model based on third world customer service, bait-and-switch pricing, high churn and consequent heavy marketing and customer acquisition costs and a general disregard for customer experience, then they probably wouldn't have been loss making for years and now need to raise prices.  The declining ARPU tells its own story, especially when you factor in whatever price index you see best fitted to corporate results, which means that ARPU has been worsening even more significantly than the bare non-adjusted figures.

I do object to the attempt to the persistent attempts by the company and some fanbois to rationalise this as externally imposed and driven by matters outside their control; Perhaps you might reconsider some of you posts about VM needing to recover their rising costs, since they are not rising?  And I particularly object to the underhand way that the price rise is being applied.

I never did get an answer to the question of why you appear so keen to defend VM, perhaps asking a third time might get me an answer?


@Anonymous wrote:

They are indeed an interesting set of accounts. I'll have a slightly longer scan this weekend and post up my "quick takes". 


Warning: Technical, dull, requires some knowledge of corporate accounting and economics.  And this is the short version.

Following on the discussion around VM profitability, prise rises and the justifications, as a thought experiment I wondered what if would mean for customers if VMO2 were to be sustainably profitable, and we excluded all the smoke and mirrors accounting and reporting.  So I boiled the entire VMO2 group down to its sales, it's operating costs, depreciation related costs, and a return on capital it employed.

I needed to use VMO2's annual report for the 14 months ending 2021 to get a full balance sheet, and combined with the sketchy full year results released the other day.  What these together indicated was that VMO2's Return On Capital Employed (ROCE) was about 0.9% for full year 2022, which shows the company are not sustainable; And that 0.9% is an over-estimate, as there would have been net additions to assets during 2022.  ROCE for a viable company should be 9-15% or better.  Less than 5% and a company's real value is shrinking, 7-8% means it is treading water without much return.  Ignoring new investment, just to be viable at the scale VMO2 had at the end of 2022 then an ROCE of 12% would be reasonable, and to get that would mean total sales needed to be 41% higher.  Last year's 5.5% price rise (proportionately higher for customers on discounted deals) actually led to a reduction of 3.4% in fixed line average revenue per user, who knows what the net effect of this year's monster hike will be?  But the worry is that with O2 already claiming mobile market leadership, and a relatively high price position, there's limited growth options there, and the former VM part of the business is the element that needs to see further revenue improvement.

Revenue (total sales, turnover) can be either growth through new sales or up-selling existing customers - or it's price rises.  The relative failure of Project Lightning to meaningfully grow VM's customer numbers is troubling - this suggests that VM have failed for years to grow customer numbers and the top-line, and unless that changes, the only route to profitability for VMO2 is continuing price hikes for broadband and TV customers.  Given that we've consistently seen "slippage" between VM's reported price rises and their average revenues, this would all suggest VM customers are looking at significant real terms price increases for many years to come.  An alternative to price rises would be to write off a big chunk of the VMO2 intangibles - that's going to track back to LG and Telefonica's accounts, and not going to be well received.  Well, maybe on Wall Street, where investors believe any old tishe, less so for Telefonica.

Long term VM-followers will be familiar with the fact that VM haven't looked at all profitable since forever.  Why can't that continue?  Well, these things often rumble along for a very long time until one day a little boy shouts that the emperor has no clothes on, and at the moment VMO2 is owned by two large foreign companies - do they have an interest in unravelling what's going on here?  And for their investors, do they have the interest to dig that deep in one foreign overseas joint venture?  There is that alternative to price rises of a huge writedown of the asset values of VMO2, unfortunately that would attract investor attention, would suggest that the merger valuations were unreliable etc etc.  Can't see them doing that.

My account furkling also turned up a couple of curious facts.  BT Group and VMO2 have approximately the same capital employed value, despite BT having double VMO2's revenue and national coverage - does this seem credible to anybody?  And looking at VMO2's vast capital employed value, that includes "intangibles" that are more than double the value for VMO2's entire network and technology assets; Hmm.  May be down to persistent capitalisation of marketing costs - are the O2 brand, and Virgin Media's rented and rather shop soiled brand really that valuable? 

Sounds like it has been badly managed, what about the Government grants they might have to pay back if it goes bankrupt?  🙄

Andrew-G
Alessandro Volta

@Buffer6 wrote:

Sounds like it has been badly managed, what about the Government grants they might have to pay back if it goes bankrupt?  🙄


Badly managed?  Certainly my opinion, but don't think there's any danger of VMO2 going bust - they've two very rich parent companies, there is a strong income stream and clear business proposition.  A private equity investor would be salivating over the customer and tangible assets here (not so much the intangibles).  The issue is simply under-performance.  If it continues for long enough the parent companies have to come up with a plan B, and I've been part of such efforts myself when a subsidiary was simply unable to get its act together and the parent company decided it wouldn't keep bailing out its subsidiary.  Such arrangements are never pretty.  Or VMO2 could be technically processed through a pre-pack administration, where all the liabilities get put into a paper bag that is declared bankrupt, and is set fire to and thrown away, and the survivable parts of the business continue under new ownership and management.  I've been part of one of those deals too. 

In terms of grants, they don't appear to be material here.  Government's biggest favour to VM has been carry forward of tax losses, but that's available to all loss making companies and the deferred tax assets were only £75m at end of 2021.  VM have paid little or no corporation tax for many years now, as corporation tax is on taxable profit, but in the long term any company can't (in practice) pay recurring dividends without making a profit, and with a profit they'll have to pay tax.  There's an offset for allowable investments during the year, because you can offset investment against taxable profit, but you can't invest your way to perpetual tax avoidance.

I would imagine Telefonica directors are looking at VMO2's results and asking themselves how on earth they got into bed with Liberty Global, and more importantly how they're now going to get out.  The merger's planned savings don't come anywhere near filling the gap in required return on capital.